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Over the past decade the regulation of exports of critical' tech-
nologies 2 has become an extremely controversial topic for discussion
* M.P.A. 1982, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1982, Stetson University College
of Law; LL.M. in International and Comparative Law 1984, Georgetown University Law
Center. Mr. Overly currently is a law clerk to Judge Robert J. Yock of the United States
Claims Court. He was formerly an attorney with the United States Department of
Commerce.
I "Critical" may be defined as a form of proprietary knowledge sufficiently esoteric
to be known to only a few persons. M. MOUNTAIN, Technology Exports and National Security
22, 26, in ISSUES IN EAST-WEST COMMERCIAL RELATIONS-A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUB-
MITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITrEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Gov't
Printing Off. 1979). In the context of national security, it is technology that the Soviets do
not yet have and that we do not want them to acquire. Id.
2 The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. V 1981)), defines technology as "the information
and know-how that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or reconstruct
goods, including computer software and technical data, but not the goods themselves."
50 U.S.C. app. § 2415(4). Basically, technology is "the application of science to the manu-
facture of products and services. It is the specific know-how required to define a product
that fulfills a need, to design the product, and to manufacture it. The product is the end
result of this technology, but it is not technology." M. MOUNTAIN, supra note 1, at 23
(quoting J. Fred Bucy, Chairman, Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S.
Technology).
The Defense Department has defined "critical technology" as:
classified and unclassified nuclear and non-nuclear unpublished technical
data, whose acquisition by a potential adversary could make a significant con-
tribution, which would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States, to the military potential of such country-irrespective of
whether such technology is acquired directly from the United States or indi-
rectly through another recipient, or whether the declared intended end-use
by the recipient is a military or nonmilitary use.
Transfer of Technology and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearings before the Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
90-91 (1978) (Memorandum from Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries
of the Military Departments (Aug. 26, 1977)) [hereinafter cited as Dresser Industries].
An export of technology occurs not only when there is a shipment of technology out
of the United States, but also when technology is imparted to a foreign entity or individual
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among members of the federal government, the international busi-
ness community, and the legal profession.3 Historically, govern-
ments have used export restrictions to protect both national
security4 and foreign policy interests. Prior to 1949 the United
States had enforced export controls only during times of war. With
the enactment of the Export Control Act of 1949, 5 however, Con-
gress initiated regulation of all United States exports. Over the next
thirty-five years, Congress enacted a variety of export controls
designed to protect national security while promoting exports of
United States commodities. 6
by means of oral exchanges of information or through the provision of services, training,
or visual inspection. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b) (1983).
3 For an excellent review of U.S. export controls, see Berman & Garson, United States
Export Controls-Past, Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1967). See generally Alexan-
der, Preserving High Technology Secrets: National Security Controls on University Research and
Teaching, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173 (1983); Davison, Exports of Technical Data and the
Export Control Act: Hearing Examiners and Consent Decrees, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 209 (1964);
Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1973);
Kalivoda, The Export Administration Act's Technical Data Regulations: Do They Violate the First
Amendment?, 11 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 563 (1981); McQuade, U.S. Trade With Eastern Eu-
rope: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW & POL', INT'L Bus. 42 (1971); Monahan, The Regula-
tion of Technical Data Under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Export Administration Act
of 1979: A Matter of Executive Discretion, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 169 (1983); Rubin,
United States Export Controls: An Immodest Proposal, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633 (1967-68);
Thau, Control of Exports from the U.S.A., 19 Bus. LAw. 845 (1964); Comment, The Export
Administration Act of 1979: Refining United States Export Control Machinery, 4 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 77 (1981); Note, Export Controls-A National Security Standard?, 12 VA.J. INT'L
L. 92 (1971).
4 The term "national security" has been defined by the Defense Department as a
"condition provided by: (a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or
group of nations, or (b) a favorable foreign relations position, or (c) a defense posture
capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt
or covert." M. MOUNTAIN, supra note 1, at 23 (citing The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pub. 1, The
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (U.S. Gov't Printing Off.
1974)).
5 Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1964)
(expired 1969)).
6 There are three types of export controls. The first type regulates exports of U.S.
commodities and of U.S. technology in general. See Export Control Act of 1949, id.; Ex-
port Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976) (expired 1979)); Export Administration Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, 88 Stat. 1552 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402-2404, 2413
(1976) (expired 1979)); Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
233, Tit. III, 91 Stat. 1625, 1629 (expired 1979); Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982)); Invention
Secrecy Act of 1951, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 805 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188
(1982)); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982)). All references to an Export Administration
Act hereinafter will be cited as "EAA."
The second type of export control regulates the export of arms and military technol-
ogy. See Neutrality Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 4 (1939) (partially repealed 1954); Mutual Secur-
ity Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 665, 68 Stat. 832 (1954) (partially repealed in 1976); Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1982)).
The third type of export controls allows the President to exercise broad authority over
U.S. exports during times of national emergency. See Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,
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Beginning in 1974 the legislative and the executive branches un-
dertook a comprehensive review of United States export regulations,
focusing on the inherent conflict between protecting national secur-
ity and promoting exports.7 Concern over export controls arose af-
ter the executive branch denied or delayed a significant number of
export license applications for the export of United States commodi-
ties to such countries as South Africa, Libya, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, while acting in the name of national security or
foreign policy.8
As a result, both Congress and the business community became
increasingly frustrated by the executive branch's interpretation and
implementation of the Export Administration Act of 1969.9 This
frustration culminated in the adoption of a new philosophical ap-
proach-promoting the exportation of "noncritical" United States
technologies, while insuring the protection of national security. Dur-
ing 1983 and 1984 Congress considered proposed legislation that
would significantly alter the Export Administration Act of 1979.10
The proposals present some of the most drastic changes for United
States export policy in the last fifteen years. 1 ' As of the writing of
ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1982) and 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44
(1982)). The Trading with the Enemy Act was amended in 1977 to restrict the President's
power to wartime, but a "grandfather clause" continued restrictions already in force.
Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. I, 91 Stat. 1625
(1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982)); International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. III, 91 Stat. at 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (1982)).
7 In 1974 the Defense Department established a task force to study the effects of
export restrictions on U.S. commodities. The task force's recommendations, commonly
referred to as the "Bucy Report" (for the task force chairmanJ. Fred Bucy of Texas Instru-
ments), advocated U.S. regulation of exports based on "technology," rather than end
products, and is published as "Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Tech-
nology-A D.O.D. Perspective 34 (1976), reprinted in Dresser Industries, supra note 2, at 33-89
(hereinafter cited as Bucy Report]. This recommendation was later adopted expressly by
Congress in the EAA of 1979, supra note 2. 125 CONG. REC. H87713-15 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1979). The Bucy Report recommended strict control over the three types of exports
that were believed to be the most effective means for exporting American technology: (a)
arrays of design and manufacturing information, including detailed instructions on both
the design and manufacturing process; (b) "Keystone" manufacturing, inspection, or auto-
matic test equipment; and (c) products accompanied by sophisticated operation, applica-
tion, or maintenance information. Bucy Report, at 3. Further, it recommended that the
Defense Department develop a list of "critical technologies" to use in regulating exports.
Id. at 28, 30.
8 Murphy & Downey, National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The Quan-
dary of United States Export Controls, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 790, 791-92 (1981).
9 Id.
10 See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1983, H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 3231]; Export Administration Act Amendments of
1983, S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
SI1 See also Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int 'l Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION AcTs AMENDMENTS OF 1983, S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
426 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 10
this article, however, Congress remains hopelessly deadlocked over
the national security provisions of these amendments.
The purposes of this article are threefold. First, it briefly re-
views the historical evolution of the critical technologies approach to
export regulation. Second, it compares the provisions of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 to the current legislative proposals, with
particular emphasis on the licensing of United States exports, the
designation of critical technologies, and the enforcement of statutory
sanctions for violation of United States export restrictions. Finally, it
briefly reviews two recent examples of the inherent problem of pro-
moting United States exports while protecting national security.
II. Evolution of the Critical Technologies Approach to Export
Regulation
Prior to 1949 the United States had restricted its use of export
controls, with only a few very limited exceptions, to times of war and
of national emergency. 12 Following World War II, however, Con-
gress passed the Export Control Act of 1949 (Export Control Act) in
response to the cold war between the United States and the Soviet
Union. This Act authorized the President to prohibit or curtail the
exportation from the United States of any articles, materials, or sup-
plies, including technical data, as deemed necessary to safeguard do-
mestic supplies, promote foreign policy, and protect national
security.' 3 The President delegated this new authority to the Office
(1983) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 170]; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 257 (Parts 1,2, and 3), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
12 Prior to 1949 the primary U.S. export regulations were contained in the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 1917, supra note 6, which specifically provides that:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person in the United States, except with the
license of the President, . . .to trade, or attempt to trade, either directly or
indirectly, with, to, or from, or for, or on account of, or on behalf of, or for
the benefit of, any other person, with knowledge or reasonable cause to be-
lieve that such other person is an enemy or ally of an enemy, or is conducting
or taking part in such trade, directly or indirectly, for, or on account of, or on
behalf of, or for the benefit of, an enemy or ally of an enemy.
50 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
13 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Export Administration, OVERVIEW OF THE Ex-
PORT ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM 1 (Commerce 1984) [hereinafter cited as EAA Overview];
Export Control Act, supra note 5. Section 2023(a) of the EAA of 1979 delegates to the
President almost unlimited power to control exports:
To effectuate the policies [of protecting short supplies, furthering foreign
policy, and protecting national security] set forth in section 2 hereof, the
President may prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States, its
Territories, and possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies, including
technical data, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe.
To the extent necessary to achieve effective enforcement of this Act, such
rules and regulations may apply to the financing, transporting, and other
servicing of exports and the participation therein by any person.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2023(a).
In a prominent 1967 study of export regulations, Berman & Garson concluded:
Probably no single piece of legislation gives more power to the President to
control American commerce. Subject to only the vaguest standards of "for-
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of Export Control of the Commerce Department.1 4
Problems developed, however, with the executive branch's zeal-
ous implementation of this new export regulatory authority. 15 The
most serious problem was the creation of a virtual embargo on the
export of all United States military and industrial commodities, and
of a substantial number of consumer goods, to communist coun-
tries.' 6 The underlying rationale was to deny our "communist ad-
versaries" anything that might enhance either their economic or
their military potential.17
In addition to the restrictions placed on the export of United
States commodities by the Export Control Act, the United States en-
tered into multilateral export restriction agreements beginning in
1949. The United States recognized that unilateral export restric-
tions would prevent neither the export of strategic commodities
from other developed countries to communist countries, nor the
transshipment of United States strategic commodities to communist
countries. 18
As a result, in 1949 the United States and six of its allies infor-
mally joined together to form the Coordinating Committee on Ex-
port Controls (COCOM).' 9 COCOM is responsible for coordinating
the efforts of member countries to prevent the export of any strate-
gic commodities to communist countries. 20 In 1951 Congress en-
acted the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 2 ' commonly referred to as
eign policy" and "national security and welfare," he has authority to cut off
the entire export trade of the United States, or any part of it, or to deny
"export privileges" to any or all persons.
Berman & Garson, supra note 3, at 792.
14 See id. at 806-07. The Export Control Act of 1949, supra note 5, provided in
§ 2023(b) that the President could "delegate the power, authority, and discretion con-
ferred upon him by this Act to such departments, agencies, or officials of the Government
as he may deem appropriate."
15 Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 894,
895 (1979). See Ecker, National Security Protection: The Critical Technologies Approach to U.S.
Export Control of High-Level Technology, 15J. INT'L L. & ECON. 575 (1981).
16 Bingham &Johnson, supra note 15, at 895.
17 Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Refining United States Export Control
Machinery, 4 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 77, 83 (1981).
18 Berman & Garson, supra note 3, at 834-35.
19 Currently COCOM is composed of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. EAA Overview, supra note
13, at 10 n.5.
20 The European members of the COCOM, however, have designated far fewer com-
modities as strategic commodities than has the United States. This discrepancy in the
European Community's control practices is reflected in the differing.volumes of trade con-
ducted by the European Community and the United States with Soviet Bloc countries. See
generally Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The European Perspective: Hearings Before the Joint Economic
Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
21 Pub. L. No. 82-213, 65 Stat. 645 (1951) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-13(d)
(1976) (superseded 1979)). In enacting the EAA of 1979, Congress repealed the "Battle
Act" to simplify and consolidate U.S. export controls. FAA of 1979, supra note 6,
§ 2416(e). United States participation in COCOM, however, continues to be authorized
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the "Battle Act," 2 2 which had the dual purpose of institutionalizing
United States participation in COCOM and of authorizing restric-
tions on United States foreign assistance to those countries export-
ing commodities designated by the State Department as strategic
commodities. 23
COCOM currently regulates the exportation of specific com-
modities through the operation of three embargo lists: the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy List, the International Munitions List, and the
International List. 24 While the International Atomic Energy List and
the International Munitions List regulate the export of commodities
and technologies directly applicable to military end-use, the Interna-
tional List regulates exports of dual-use commodities and technolo-
gies. These are exports that have both military and nonmilitary
applications and that are not regulated by the other two embargo
lists.25
In recent years, Congress repeatedly has criticized COCOM's ef-
fectiveness. 26 This criticism has been directed primarily at the fail-
ure of COCOM member countries to enact the necessary domestic
legislation for implementing the COCOM export controls. 27 In its
1979 report, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs declared that
it continued "to find instances of circumvention of COCOM that
have been detrimental to both United States [national] security and
export competitiveness. ' 28
In 1962 Congress passed the Export Control Amendments Act,
which requires the President to deny an export license for any com-
modity that "makes a significant contribution to the military or eco-
by virtue of § 2404(i) of the EAA of 1979, which authorizes the President to negotiate with
COCOM for the purpose of reaching an agreement to reduce the scope of COCOM ex-
port controls to a level acceptable to and enforceable by all COCOM members.
'22 The Battle Act specifically proscribed exports to "any nation or combination of
nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics and all countries under its domination." Pub. L. No. 82-213, 65 Stat. 645
(superseded 1979).
23 The State Department was required under the Battle Act to designate those strate-
gically significant commodities that were to be subject to strict export regulation. See DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951 (BATTLE ACT)
REPORTS (1952-1979).
24 See Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade & Commerce of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976)
(testimony of Robert B. Wright, director, Office of East-West Trade, State Department)
[hereinafter referred to as Export Licensing of Advanced Technology].
25 Id.
26 Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings and Markup
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign .4ffairs, Part
1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (testimony of George W. Ball); EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1979, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, H.R. REP. No. 200, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. See also Export Licensing of
Advanced Technology, supra note 24, at 218 (testimony of J. Fred Bucy).
27 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 121 EXPORT AD. REP. 44 (1979-80).
28 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
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nomic potential of any nation [where such commmodity] would
prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United
States." 29 Export restrictions on both commercial and military com-
modities were justified, for the most part, on the premise that the
development of the Soviet Union's industrial base would adversely
affect United States national security.3 0
By 1969, however, gradual moderation of the United States phi-
losophy against trade with the Soviet Bloc resulted in the Commerce
Department's loosening of export controls on the sale of United
States commodities to communist countries. 3 ' As a result, Congress
replaced the Export Control Act with the Export Administration Act
of 1969 (EAA of 1969).32 The EAA of 1969 established the new phi-
losophy of encouraging trade with all nations, including communist
countries.3 3 Unlike previous years under the Export Control Act,
Congress assumed a more active role in overseeing the executive
branch's implementation of the EAA of 1969. In this regard, Con-
gress sought to terminate the executive branch's erratic enforcement
of the Export Control Act, which had proven both detrimental to
United States business and ineffective in preventing exports of stra-
tegic commodities.3 4
Over the next ten years the United States continued to relax its
export controls on exports to communist countries.3 5 Primarily, this
29 Export Control Amendments of 1962, § 4, 76 Stat. 127 (1962) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 2023 (1964) (repealed 1969)).
30 Berman & Garson, supra note 3, at 801.
Sl See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 9860 (1969) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie); see also
id. at 9861 (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale).
32 See also Export Expansion and Regulation Hearings on S. 813 and S. 1940 Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); To Extend and Amend the Export Control Act of 1949: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int l
Trade of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
33 EAA of 1969, supra note 6, § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(1). See EAA Overview, supra
note 13, at 3.
34 Philbin, Soviet Technology: Status, Trends and Strategies, 445 AIR WAR C. REP. 122, 123
(1978).
35 At least four factors can be attributed directly to the continued moderation of ex-
port controls on trade with the Soviet Bloc:
(I) the economic recovery of Western Europe and the strengthened Western Euro-
pean security in relation to the communist countries;
(2) growth in the economic strength of Eastern Europe and its confidence in its secur-
ity vis-a-vis the West;
(3) a shattering of the appearance and reality of world unity among the communist
countries; and
(4) a decline in the rigid ideological assumption held by both East and West concern-
ing each other, coupled with corresponding adjustments of conduct.
See McQuade, U.S. Trade with Eastern Europe: Its Prospects and Parameters, 3 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 42, 48 (1971). See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REVIEW OF THE U.S./U.S.S.R.
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1977), reprinted
in Key Issues in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific Exchanges and Technology Transfers: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic and Int'l Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 428-59, 460-504 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Key
Issues]; Osofsky, U.S.-Soviet Trade: Problems and Prospects, 27 MERCER L. REV. 717 (1976);
1985]
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new philosophy resulted from recognition that national security
could be threatened by both communist and noncommunist coun-
tries.3 6 In balancing the growing needs of United States business
against those of national security, the United States Government rec-
ognized that sweeping prohibitions on the export of United States
commodities were not justified even if the importing country was
communist. 37
In 1977 Congress broadened the general coverage of the EAA
of 1969, placing greater emphasis on the identification of particular
commodities and technologies likely to contribute to foreign threats
to national security.38 Prior to this legislation, the Commerce De-
partment had been restricted in its efforts to regulate exports of
United States commodities and technologies to those exports subject
to United States jurisdiction.39 Under the new amendments, how-
ever, the Commerce Department was authorized to exercise control
over foreign-origin goods and technologies exported by United
States-owned or United States-controlled companies abroad, regard-
less of origin, and over foreign-produced products of United States
technologies. 40
The amendments also reflected a significant increase in the flexi-
bility of United States export policy. Export licenses no longer were
to be granted or denied on the basis of whether the final destination
of the exports was a communist or noncommunist country. 4' After
Comment, An Overview of Export Controls on Transfer of Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 555, 564 (1980) (it is not
insignificant that this change in [U.S.] perspective followed a period of increasing trade
with the Soviet Union).
36 See H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 362, 364-65.
37 Id.
38 Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, supra note 6.
39 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 1. Prior to 1977 the EAA of 1969 authorized the
Commerce Department to regulate four general types of export transactions:
(a) exports of commodities and technical data from the United States;
(b) reexports of U.S. origin commodities and technical data from one foreign country
to another;
(c) exports and reexports from a foreign country of foreign products containing U.S.
origin parts and components; and
(d) exports and reexports from a foreign country of foreign products based on U.S.
origin technical data. Id.
40 Id. Under this amendment, the Commerce Department could control the export of
all goods and technology "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." EAA of 1979, supra note 6,
§ 2405(a)(1). See also S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4540, 4545. Traditionally, the United States has imposed export con-
trols on three types of foreign exports: (1) reexports of U.S. origin goods or technology
by a foreign country, 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1-374.9 (1983); (2) exports of foreign origin goods
that include U.S. origin parts or components, id. § 376.12; and (3) exports of foreign ori-
gin goods that are the products of U.S. origin technology. Id. § 379.8.
41 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 3. See EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(b). In
accordance with § 2404(b), the Commerce Department maintains different levels of export
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1977 several factors were to be considered in reaching export licens-
ing decisions, including the destination country's present and poten-
tial relationship to the United States. 42
Following enactment of the EAA of 1969 and its subsequent
amendments, the overall volume of United States exports to the So-
viet Bloc increased dramatically.43 This reflected not only an in-
crease in the total volume of United States exports but also, and
more significantly, a substantial increase in United States exports of
high technology products.44 While viewed quite favorably by the
United States business community, this increase in exports of high
technology products was a major cause of concern for critics of the
EAA of 1969. 45 These critics were concerned that the United States
was supplying the Soviet Bloc countries with military know-how that
could allow the Soviet Union to gain strategic parity with the United
States and its Western allies.46
In 1979 Congress replaced the EAA of 1969 with the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (EAA of 1979),47 incorporating the "crit-
ical technology" approach originally advocated in the final report of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Export of United
States Technology.48 In the EAA of 1979, Congress stated that:
the administration of export controls imposed for national security
purposes gives special emphasis to the need to control exports of
technology (and goods which contribute significantly to the transfer
of such technology) which could make a significant contribution to
the military potential of any country or combination of countries
which could be detrimental to the national security of the United
controls based upon "country groups" to which exports are controlled for national secur-
ity purposes. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 370, Supp. No. 1 (1983).
42 EAA of 1969, supra note 6, § 2403(b)(2).
43 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 118 EXPORT AD. REP. 11 (1978). See also Key Issues, supra
note 35, at 428.
44 See Transfer of Technology to the Soviet Bloc: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1980).
45 See U.S. Embargo of Food and Technology to the Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Int 'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hoing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
90 (1980) (testimony of William J. Perry, Undersecretary for Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense).
46 See Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings and Markup
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Part
1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 435 (1979) (testimony of Ruth M. Davis) [hereinafter cited as Exten-
sion and Revision of the EAA of 1969].
47 EAA of 1979, supra note 6.
48 125 CONG. REC. H87713-15 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1979). For a discussion of the
Bucy report, see supra note 7. For comment on the critical technologies approach, see
Extension and Revision of the EAA of 1969, supra note 46; Key Issues, supra note 35, at 202
(testimony of Charles H. Phipps); Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings of the
Subcomm. on Int 7 Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 299 (1976) (testimony of Thomas Christiansen). For a discussion of pro-
posed congressional legislative alternatives to the EAA of 1979, see Note, U.S. Technology
Transfers to the Soviet Union and the Protection of National Security, 11 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
1037, 1078-92 (1979).
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49
The purpose behind the EAA of 1979 was to provide the Presi-
dent with authority to control United States exports, while ensuring
that the exercise of such authority imposed export controls only
when necessary. 50 Further, the EAA of 1979 continued to allow the
President to restrict United States exports to safeguard national se-
curity, promote foreign policy, and protect the domestic economy
from being drained of scarce materials and from the inflationary im-
pact of foreign demand. 51 Imposition of such export controls, how-
ever, was allowed only after full consideration of their impact on the
United States economy. 52 The EAA of 1979 was administered
through the issuance of export licenses by the Office of Export Ad-
ministration of the Commerce Department, as was the Export Con-
trol Act and the EAA of 1969. 5 3
49 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2401(8). The national security standard of the EAA
of 1979, however, was actually little different from that contained in the EAA of 1969. The
only significant change was an increased scrutiny over exports of technology. S. REP. No.
169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
50 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Pub. L. No. 1461, U.S. Embargoes on Agricultural Exports:
Implications for the U.S. Agricultural Industry and U.S. Exports, U.S.I. T. C. Report on Investigation
No. 332-157 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Agricul-
tural Embargo Implications].
51 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2402(2). The Commerce Department has defined the
applicability of these three types of controls in the following manner:
(1) National security controls are instituted to provide control of exports
making a significant contribution to the military potential of countries to the
detriment of the United States, such as strategic commodities and technical
data to the U.S.S.R., other Warsaw Pact countries, Laos, and the People's
Republic of China.
(2) Foreign policy controls are instituted to significantly further United
States foreign policy or fulfill its declared international obligations, such as
restrictions on exports to the Republic of South Africa, and Namibia, which
are maintained in part to further U.S. policy and in part to support United
Nations Security Council Resolutions. Controls may be in effect for both
security and foreign policy reasons, such as controls on North Korea, Viet-
nam, Kampuchea, and Cuba.(3) Short supply controls are used to protect the domestic economy
from excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce inflation induced by
export demand.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A SUMMARY OF U.S. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS 1
(Oct. 1981). The national security controls contained in the EAA of 1979, however, out-
weigh in importance foreign policy and short supply controls. EAA Overview, supra note
13, at 2. See also Abbot, Linking Trade to Political Goals, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1981).
52 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2402(2).
53 45 Fed. Reg. 64,226 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 29,783 (1980). Seealso 15 C.F.R. §§ 370-
373 (1983). Prior to the EAA of 1979 all exports of goods and technical data required the
issuance of either a general license or a validated license by the Office of Export Adminis-
tration. Id. § 370.3(a). A general license is a broad authorization that does not require the
filing of an application or the issuance of a license document. Id. § 371.1. On the other
hand, a validated license is a formal document issued by the Office of Export Administra-
tion, after written application by the prospective exporter, which authorizes a particular
export within the specific confines of the license document. Id. § 372.2(a).
Under the EAA of 1979, however, a third type of export license, a qualified general
license, was authorized for issuance. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(2). For a full discussion
of licensing under the EAA of 1979, see infra notes 60-118 and accompanying text. In
addition to the Office of Export Administration, several other government agencies ad-
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On September 30, 1983, the provisions of the EAA of 1979 ex-
pired.5 4 Under the authority conferred by the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act, 55 President Reagan declared a national
emergency and reimposed the provisions of the EAA of 1979 on all
United States exports. While the specific amending and reauthoriz-
ing export legislation was proposed in both houses of Congress in
June of 1983, Congress has yet to enact the necessary legislation.
The Conference Committee indicated that its members were dead-
locked over the national security provisions of the proposals, among
other issues.
While the House proposal would allow unrestricted exports to
COCOM countries, 56 the Senate proposal would refrain from open-
ing unrestricted trade with COCOM countries. 57 The House would
continue to vest the enforcement responsibility for the EAA of 1979
in the Commerce Department, 58 but the Senate, as a result of its dis-
satisfaction with the Commerce Department's prior enforcement ef-
forts, would place the enforcement authority in the Commissioner of
the Customs Service of the Treasury Department. 59
III. Comparison of the Export Administration Act of 1979 to the
Proposed Export Administration Amendments of 1983
A. Export Licensing of United States Commodities
In amending the EAA of 1979, Congress was concerned particu-
larly with complaints from United States business about the lengthy
delays inherent in pre-1979 export license application decisions. 60
minister export controls under statutory authority. For a complete listing of agencies in-
volved in the export regulation process and the commodities regulated by those agencies,
see 15 C.F.R. § 370.10 (1983).
54 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2419.
55 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, supra note 6, § 202, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1982).
56 H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 106(b). Specifically, the proposed modification would
read:
No authority or permission to export may be required under this section
before goods or technology are exported in the case of exports to a country
which maintains export controls on such goods or technology cooperatively
with the United States, except that the Secretary may require an export li-
cense for the export of such goods or technology to such end users as the
Secretary may specify by regulation. The Secretary may also by regulation
require any person exporting any such goods or technology otherwise sub-
ject to export controls under this section to notify the Department of Com-
merce of those exports.
Id.
57 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 7.
58 H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 103(2).
59 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, §§ 20-22, 31.
60 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 20-21. In this Report, the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs stated that the problem of excessive delays in the processing of export
license applications has several problems:
[Olne is the inherent complexity of many licensing decisions. Another is the
differing perspectives of the various agencies involved in the process, pro-
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As a result, Congress authorized three primary types of export
licenses under the EAA of 1979 for issuance by the Commerce
Department:
(1) a validated license, authorizing a specific export, issued pur-
suant to an application by the exporter;
(2) a qualified general license, authorizing multiple exports, is-
sued pursuant to an application by the exporter; and
(3) a general license, authorizing exports, without application
by the exporter. 61
Although the pending legislative proposals would modify the types
of licenses available to exporters, 62 substantively they represent only
minor changes to the EAA of 1979. Primarily, the changes will re-
quire that exporters apply for the new license that is most applicable
to their proposed export transaction.
In the EAA of 1979, Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the
Commerce Department's policy of requiring the submission of a
"large volume of validated export license applications" and en-
couraged the Department to require only a qualified general license,
rather than a validated license, for the export of goods or technolo-
gies that are restricted by a multilateral agreement not requiring the
prior approval of the other parties to the agreement. 63
The current legislative proposals continue to emphasize that the
Commerce Department is to refrain from requiring a large number
of validated license applications. 64 The Senate version, however,
which refrains from opening unrestricted trade with treaty countries
(for example, COCOM members), would expressly allow the Com-
merce Department to require a validated license for any goods or
technologies on the militarily critical technologies list (MCTL).65
Under the EAA of 1979, Congress also limited the Commerce
Department's ability to require a validated license for the export of
ducing interagency disagreements which are sometimes difficult to reconcile.
A third is the volume of applications submitted: licensing officers are
tempted to put aside the troublesome cases in order to keep up with the flow
of routine ones. A fourth is the fact that applications are often farmed out to
technical experts and other officials for whom the applications constitute an
intrusion upon normal duties, and who therefore do not accord the applica-
tions high priority. Finally, there are allegations by industry that applications
are sometimes deliberately held up by licensing officers who may simply be
personally opposed to the proposed export.
Id.
61 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2403(a). In addition to the three enumerated
licenses, the EAA of 1979 also authorized "such other licenses as may assist in the effective
and efficient implementation of this Act." Id.
62 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 25 (providing for a validated license, a validated
license authorizing multiple exports, and a general license); H.R. 3231, supra note 10,
§ 3(1) (providing for a validated license, a validated license authorizing multiple exports,
and a general license).
63 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(e)(1), (3).
64 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 26; H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 106(d).
65 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 9.
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goods and technology, consistent with United States national secur-
ity, to three specific instances:
(A) the export of such goods or technology is restricted pursu-
ant to a multilateral agreement, formal or informal, to which the
United States is a party and, under the terms of such multilateral
agreement, such export requires the specific approval of the parties
to such multilateral agreement;
(B) with respect to such goods or technology, other nations do
not possess capabilities comparable to those possessed by the
United States; or
(C) the United States is seeking the agreement of other suppli-
ers to apply comparable controls to such goods or technology and,
in the judgment of the Secretary [of Commerce], United States ex-
port controls on such goods or technology, by means of such li-
cense, are necessary pending the conclusion of such agreement.
6 6
These three criteria have been retained intact in both of the current
legislative proposals. 67
The particular export license needed for a specific export, to a
particular destination, is determined by reference to the commodity
control list (CCL) maintained by the Commerce Department.6 8 The
CCL divides goods and technologies into export categories and
specifies the country group level of control.6 9 Currently, there are
seven country groups into which all of the world's countries have
been divided, with the exception of Canada which is not included in
any country group level. 70 Under the CCL, countries are separated
into two categories: communist countries and countries to which ex-
ports are restricted by virtue of foreign policy controls. 7 1
Since the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, the Commerce
Department has tightened significantly its export licensing policy
with regard to communist countries. 72 As for the free world coun-
66 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(e)(2).
67 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 43; H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 106(d).
68 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, §§ 2403(b), 2404(c)(1). See also 15 C.F.R. § 399.1
(1983). The Senate proposal would change the name of the CCL to simply "Control List."
S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 26.
69 15 C.F.R. § 399.1(f)(1) (1983). Generally, all exports from the United States are
prohibited unless licensed by the Office of Export Administration. Id. § 370.3(a). There
are four basic exceptions: (i) almost all exports to Canada for consumption in Canada, id.
§ 370.3(a)(1); (2) exports regulated by another governmental agency, id. § 370.3(a)(3); (3)
certain exports to U.S. armed forces, id. § 370.3(a)(2); and (4) exports to U.S. territories,
dependencies, and possessions, id. § 370.4.
70 Id. § 370, Supp. I.
71 Id.
72 Id. See also EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 4. Prior to the Soviet Union's invasion
of Afghanistan, the country group policy was the same for all countries to which exports
are restricted for national security reasons, except that a near total embargo was, and is,
maintained on exports to North Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Cuba. Exports gener-
ally were allowed to the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact countries, and the People's Re-
public of China, provided the proposed export could not adversely affect U.S. national
security.
Following the invasion of Afghanistan, export license applications for export to the
Soviet Union, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania of commodities requiring COCOM approval
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tries (except Canada), the Commerce Department has followed a
policy of granting export licenses where there are no foreign policy
or short supply export controls and where there is no risk of trans-
shipment of the particular commodities to any controlled destination
to which the Department would not otherwise approve an export li-
cense. 73 To safeguard against transshipment, the importer must ob-
tain authorization from the Commerce Department to re-export,
from one country to another, any United States-origin goods or tech-
nologies for which a validated license would be required to make a
direct export from the United States to the new proposed
destination.74
Prior to the EAA of 1979, the Secretary of Commerce was
charged with monitoring the foreign availability of commodities and
technologies on the CCL. In practice the earlier legislation was in-
terpreted as requiring only an ad hoc review of the availability of
CCL items in foreign markets, usually in response to a particular ex-
port license application. 75 Under the EAA of 1979, however, Con-
gress required the Secretary of Commerce to review continuously
the foreign availability of commodities and technologies included on
the CCL.76 The Senate has proposed that the Secretary of Com-
merce review the CCL annually, rather than every three years77 and,
as part of such review, determine the foreign availability of CCL
items for multilateral export controls and annually for unilateral ex-
port controls. 78 The Commerce Department is prohibited from re-
quiring a validated license for the export of CCL items upon
determining, on the basis of "reliable evidence," that such items are
available from foreign sources. 79
generally were denied. Further, export license applications for export to other Warsaw
Pact countries, Albania, Laos, and the Mongolian People's Republic were considered on
the basis of their potential for diversion to military use in those countries and in the Soviet
Union. Id. at 3.
73 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 4.
74 Id. at 4-5.
75 Murphy & Downey, supra note 8, at 803.
76 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(f)(1).
77 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(c)(3).
78 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 7.
79 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(0(1). Further, the EAA of 1979 specifically
provided:
Upon written request by representatives of a substantial segment of any in-
dustry which produces any goods or technology subject to export controls
under this section or being considered for such controls because of their sig-
nificance to the national security of the United States, the Secretary [of Com-
merce] shall appoint a technical advisory committee for any such goods or
technology which the Secretary determines are difficult to evaluate because
of questions concerning technical matters, worldwide availability, and actual
utilization of production and technology, or licensing procedures.
Id. § 2404(h)(1). In enacting the above provision, Congress expressed its opinion that
industry representatives would have both first-hand knowledge of foreign availability and
the incentive to document its existence.
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The President has the authority, however, to require the issu-
ance of a validated license for the export of the particular commod-
ity, foreign availability notwithstanding, if it is determined that such
a license is necessary to protect national security.80 If the President
decides to require the issuance of a validated license, the Secretary of
Commerce must publish a statement of the basis for the decision and
of its estimated economic effect."'
The EAA of 1979 also introduced the concept of "indexing,"
which requires the removal of particular commodities or technolo-
gies from the CCL upon a finding that their export no longer repre-
sents a possible threat to United States national security.8 2
Originally, Congress had envisioned a system of automatic removal
of commodities and technologies from the CCL as they attained ob-
solescence. Prior to enacting the EAA of 1979, however, Congress
recognized that a universal indexing technique was not a viable pos-
sibility because of the number of commodities and technologies on
the CCL, each with differing degrees of performance levels.83
Therefore, the EAA of 1979 merely introduced the indexing concept
and invited the Commerce Department to adopt indexing proce-
dures "where appropriate. ' 8 4 The current proposals would allow
the Commerce Department to implement indexing procedures, but
neither version requires it.85
The only statutorily recognized basis for not processing a li-
cense application is that the application is improperly completed or
additional information is required.8 6 In such case, the Commerce
Department has ten days to make an initial determination as to the
proper completion of the application, the sufficiency of licensing in-
formation, the need to refer the application to another department
or agency, and the need to submit the application for multilateral
review.8 7 In processing these export license applications, the Com-
merce Department is required, if possible, to make a determination
on the export application without referring the application to any
80 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(0(1). See also S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1147, 1154-56.
s Id.
82 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(g).
83 H.R. REP. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, 52-53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 482].
84 Id.
85 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, §§ 27, 46; H.R. 3231,supra note 10, § 106(e). The
Senate's proposed annual review of the CCL, however, would appear to accomplish the
same goals originally expressed for "indexing," in that an annual review will require the
Commerce Department frequently to address the continued need for the inclusion of spe-
cific items on the CCL. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, §§ 7, 11, 26-27. See H.R. REP. No.
482, supra note 83, at 9-10, 52-53.
86 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2409(b)(3).
87 Id. § 2409(b).
1985]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
other governmental department or agency.8 8
If the application is improperly completed or additional infor-
mation is required, the Commerce Department is to "return the ap-
plication without action.''89 If a properly completed application has
been submitted that does not need to be referred to another depart-
ment or agency, the Commerce Department must issue the license or
deny the application within ninety days of its submission.9 0 The pro-
posed legislative changes would require that the Department issue
the license or deny the application within sixty days, rather than
ninety days. 9 1
If the Commerce Department determines that referral of the ap-
plication to another department or agency is required, it must refer
the application within thirty days of its submission. 9 2 The Senate
proposal would reduce this time limit to twenty days. 93 The review-
ing department or agency must then issue its recommendations
within thirty days of referral or request an optional thirty-day exten-
sion.9 4 The Senate would reduce this period to twenty days with an
optional twenty-day extension. 95
Upon return of the application to the Commerce Department, a
license must be issued or the application denied within ninety days.9 6
The Senate proposal would allow only sixty days.9 7 If the applica-
tion is denied, the Commerce Department must inform the applicant
of the particular reasons for denial, the general policies of the EAA
furthered by such denial, the national security or foreign policy inter-
ests sought to be protected, and, in the event of a denial pursuant to
foreign policy controls, evidence of consideration of the statutory
foreign policy controls criteria.9 8 The House proposal would guar-
antee the applicant at least thirty days to respond before the denial
becomes final. 99 The applicant also is entitled to be advised of possi-
ble modifications in the goods or technology that would result in the
granting of the export license.10 0
If the Commerce Department fails to process the application
within these time limits, the applicant may petition the Secretary of
88 Id. § 2409(a)(2).
89 Id. § 2409(b)(3).
90 Id. § 2409(c).
91 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 30; H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 120(a).
92 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2409(d).
93 S. REP. No. 170; supra note I1, § 30.
94 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2409(e).
95 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 68.
96 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2409(f). The Secretary of Commerce, however, has
the discretion to extend any time period prescribed by the EAA of 1979, upon determin-
ing that the application is of "exceptional importance or complexity." Id. § 2409()(4).
97 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 68.
98 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, §§ 2405(a)(3), (c), 2409(f)(3).
99 H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 120(c)(2).
100 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, §§ 2404(a)(2)(B), 2405(a)(3).
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Commerce and request compliance. 10 The Secretary must then
"take immediate steps to correct the situation."10 2 If the situation is
not corrected within thirty days from the filing of the petition, the
applicant may seek relief in a federal district court.' 0 3 The Senate
would reduce the Commerce Department's time to twenty days.10 4
If the proposed export involves goods or technologies subject to
multilateral review pursuant to a formal or informal multilateral
agreement, such as COCOM, the export license application must be
forwarded, upon final approval by the Secretary of Commerce, to the
proper multilateral reviewing body or institution.1 0 5 The Secretary
of Commerce must then notify the applicant of approval and of the
submission of the application to the multilateral review process. 10 6
If the multilateral review does not result in a final determination
within sixty days of the submission of the application, the export li-
cense must be issued by the Secretary of Commerce, unless it is de-
termined that issuance would prove detrimental to national
security. '0 7 The Senate proposal would reduce the time for multilat-
eral review to forty days. 10 8 Upon conclusion of the multilateral re-
view process, the export license, if previously issued, may be revoked
if the reviewing authority recommends denial.' 0 9
In addition, the EAA of 1979 authorized the Defense Depart-
ment to review: (1) any export license application for the export of
any goods or technologies to any country to which United States ex-
ports are controlled for national security reasons; 10 and (2) any ex-
port license application for the export, to any controlled country, of
any goods, technologies, or industrial techniques that have been de-
veloped as a result of research and development programs financed
with funds authorized for the Defense Department.III
In both situations, the Secretary of Defense must determine
whether the proposed export would make a significant contribution
to the military potential of the importing country that would be det-
rimental to United States national security." 2 The Senate proposal
would allow the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secre-
tary of Commerce, to review any proposed export where "there is a
1l Id. § 24090j)(2).
102 Id.
103 Id. § 2409(j)(3).
104 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 71.
105 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2409(h).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 70.
109 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2409(h).
I1 Id. § 2409(g).
III Id. § 2403-1(a), (b). In this respect, "controlled country" means the Soviet Union,
Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and any other coun-
tries designated by the Secretary of Defense. Id. § 2403-1 (d).
112 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, §§ 2403-1(b), 2 4 0 9 (g)(1).
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clear risk of diversion of militarily critical goods or technology to
proscribed destinations."' "1 3 If it is determined that the proposed
export would make such a contribution, the Secretary of Defense
must recommend to the President that such export license be
denied. 14
Further, the Office of Export Administration may enter into con-
sultations with other concerned government agencies. In this man-
ner, export license applications that present foreign policy or
national security problems are reviewed by more than one govern-
mental agency before a final decision is rendered. The consultations
generally take place within the context of the multilevel Advisory
Committee for Export Policy (ACEP). 115 The ACEP is composed of
representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State,
Energy, Transportation, and Treasury, the National Security Coun-
cil, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and other concerned governmental agencies.' 16 ACEP export policy
review operates at five levels:
(1) The Operating Committee of the ACEP, which is composed
of senior staff personnel of the ACEP member departments and
agencies and which is chaired by a senior Commerce Department
official;
(2) The Sub-ACEP, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level,
which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration;
(3) The ACEP, at the Assistant Secretary level, which is chaired
by the Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration;
(4) The Export Administration Review Board, at the secretary
level, which is composed of the Secretary of Commerce, as chair-
man, and includes the Secretaries of State and Defense; and
(5) The President, who has final authority to resolve all inter-
agency disputes.' 17
1i1 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 30.
114 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, §§ 2403-1(c), 24 09 (g)(1), (g)(2).
115 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 8. The ACEP was originally created as the Export
Control Review Board (ECRB) by Exec. Order No. 10,945, 3 C.F.R. 473 (Comp. 1959-63),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1972). In 1970, with the passage of the EAA of
1969, the Export Administration Review Board was created, under Exec. Order No.
11,533, 3 C.F.R. 932, 933 (Comp. 1966-70), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (1972), as a
replacement for the prior ECRB. In response to the enactment of the EAA of 1979, the
ACEP was created in 1979 by virtue of Reorganization Plan No. 3 (1979).
In addition to the ACEP, the Commerce Department periodically consults with the
Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC) of the National Security Council ad
hoc group on nuclear nonproliferation, on matters of export licensing related to nuclear
nonproliferation. The SNEC is composed of representatives from the Departments of
Commerce, State, Energy, and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. When consensus cannot be reached by the members






The ACEP functions on a consensual basis, so that a failure to agree
at any level elevates a licensing decision to the next higher level." 18
B. Designation of Critical Technologies
Unlike previous export legislation, the EAA of 1979 provided
the Secretary of Defense with the authority to "identify goods and
technology for inclusion" on the CCL. The Secretary of Defense was
authorized to refer the matter directly to the President for resolution
if the Secretary of Commerce objected to the inclusion of those iden-
tified goods and technologies on the CCL. 19 While the Commerce
Department has responsibility for establishing and maintaining the
CCL, the Defense Department has responsibility for developing the
MCTL, which represented "militarily critical goods and technologies
and the mechanisms through which such goods and technologies
may be effectively transferred." 20
In developing the MCTL, the Secretary of Defense must give
primary emphasis to:
(A) arrays of design and manufacturing know-how;
(B) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment; and
(C) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or
maintenance know-how
that are not possessed by countries to which such exports are con-
trolled, and which, if exported, would make a significant contribution
to the military potential of any such country.12' The Senate proposal
would add:
(D) goods (i) which would extend, complete, maintain, or modern-
ize a process line employed in the application of a militarily critical
technolgy, or (ii) the analysis of which would reveal or give insight
into a United States military system and would thereby facilitate
either the design and manufacture of that system or the develop-
ment of countermeasures against that system. 122
The Senate version also would expand the coverage of the MCTL to
goods and technologies that are either not possessed by or "avail-
able in fact from sources outside of the United States."' 23
The Defense Department's MCTL ultimately is to be incorpo-
rated into the Commerce Department's CCL upon the concurrence
of the Secretaries of both departments. 124 Failure to reach a consen-
118 Id.
119 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(c)(2).
120 Id. § 2404(d)(1).
121 Id. § 2404(d)(2). For reference to the "Bucy Report," which provided the basis for
the Defense Department's development of the MCTL, see supra note 7.
122 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 42.
123 Id.
124 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(d)(5). On October 1, 1980, pursuant to
§ 2404(d)(4), the Defense Department published its initial MCTL in the Federal Register.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980). The MCTL, as published, listed seventeen categories of
militarily critical technologies: computer-networks technology; computer technology;
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sus on the particular MCTL goods and technologies to be incorpo-
rated into the CCL, however, necessitates that the matter be referred
to the President for resolution. 125 If the President rejects the De-
fense Secretary's recommendations, he is required to report his deci-
sion to Congress promptly, along with the Defense Department's
recommendations. 1 2 6
In recommending that the exportation of particular technolo-
gies be contingent on the exporter obtaining a validated license, the
Defense Department stated that its goal is "to protect the United
States' lead time relative to its principal adversaries in the applica-
tion of technology to military capabilities. The lead time is to be
protected and maintained as long as is practical in order to provide
time for the replenishment of technology through new research and
development."' 127 Thus, the critical technologies approach focuses
on controlling "revolutionary," rather than "evolutionary," ad-
vances to maintain lead time on technologies undergoing rapid sci-
entific development. 128
In enacting the critical technologies lead time approach, Con-
gress included provisions designed to narrow the range of technolo-
gies whose export would require the issuance of a validated license.
First, the Defense Department may not require a validated export
license for technologies otherwise available to the country of destina-
tion in the world market, unless the President certifies that a vali-
dated license is necessary to safeguard national security. 129 Second,
the Commerce Department must review the CCL every three years
for multilateral (COCOM) export controls and annually for unilat-
eral export controls to determine the continued necessity for requir-
ing a validated license for the export of a particular commodity.130
The Senate proposal would require an annual review of the CCL by
the Commerce Department. 131 Finally, the Commerce Department
may provide for the indexing of the CCL so that validated export
license controls automatically would be removed as particular com-
software technology; automated real-time control technology; materials technology; di-
rected energy technology; semiconductor and electronic component technology; instru-
mentation technology; telecommunications technology; communication, navigation,
guidance and control technology; microwave technology; vehicular technology; optical
and laser technology; sensor technology; undersea systems technology; chemical technol-
ogy; and nuclear specific technology. Id.
125 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 8.
126 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2 4 0 9 (g)(4).
127 U.S. Dep't of Defense, Interim DOD Policy Statement on Export Control of United
States Technology, News Release No. 410-77 (Sept. 2, 1977) (containing Aug. 26 memo-
randum from Defense Secretary Brown to Secretaries of the Military Divisions). See also
Propp, Export Controls: Restrictions on the Export of Militarily Critical Technologies, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411, 416 (1981).
128 Comment, supra note 35, at 567-68.
129 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(f)(1), (4).
130 Id. § 2404(c)(3).
131 S. 979, supra note 10, § 5(c)(3).
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modities become obsolete.13 2
Since 1974 the Defense Department has participated actively in
export licensing decisions involving sensitive national security is-
sues. 3 3 In fact, the EAA of 1979 specifically requires the Defense
Department, in consultation with the Office of Export Administra-
tion, to determine which types of export transactions to con-
trolled/communist countries must be reviewed.' 34 Currently, the
Defense Department reviews approximately thirty-five percent of all
export license applications for exports to communist countries. 35
C. Enforcement of Statutory Sanctions for Violation of United States
Export Restrictions
The Secretaries of Commerce and Defense were authorized
under the EAA of 1979 to conduct investigations into possible viola-
tions of the EAA provisions.136 The Senate, however, has proposed
shifting the responsibility for enforcing United States export laws to
the United States Customs Service.' 37 In exercising such enforce-
ment powers, the Secretaries are allowed to issue subpoenas requir-
ing the appearance of any person or the production of any books,
writings, or other documents.' 38 The EAA of 1979 provided that no
person may refuse to testify by asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination,' 3 9 but he is entitled to immunity against later prose-
cution on the basis of such compelled testimony.' 40
If United States goods or technologies are exported without a
proper export license or if a licensed export is later diverted from
the approved destination, the Commerce Department is authorized
under the Export Administration Regulations to commence an inves-
tigation. Depending upon the seriousness of the violation, the inves-
tigation may culminate in a warning letter, a civil penalty, an
administrative action denying the United States exporter or foreign
importer the right to participate in future United States export trans-
actions for a specified period of time, or a referral to the Justice De-
partment for criminal prosecution in United States courts.' 4 '
The Office of Export Administration exercises the primary re-
132 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2 4 0 4 (g).
133 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 9.
134 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2403-1(a).
135 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 9.
136 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2411 (a). In addition, the EAA of 1979 authorized the
head of any governmental department or agency exercising any function under the Act to
investigate possible violations to the extent necessary to the enforcement or imposition of
any statutory penalty. Id.
137 S. 979, supra note 10, § 12(a).
138 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2411(a). See 15 C.F.R. § 387.8 (1983).
139 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2411 (b).
140 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
141 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)-(b) (1983).
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sponsibility for enforcing the Export Administration Regulations 142
and has been concerned particularly with "preventive enforcement."
This approach requires that the applicant disclose all pertinent de-
tails of the proposed export transaction, including: (1) the parties to
the transaction; (2) the destination and type of goods or technologies
to be exported; (3) the intended use of the exported goods or tech-
nologies; and (4) the foreign availability of the particular goods or
technologies. ' 4 3
In addition to a thorough review of the export license applica-
tion, the Office of Export Administration requires: (1) that import-
ers furnish documentation in support of the license application,
factual information concerning the proposed export transaction, and
assurances that they understand the destination restrictions imposed
on the distribution of United States goods and technologies; and (2)
that shippers enter prescribed statements on bills of lading and on
invoices to notify carriers, foreign forwarders, and importers of the
destinations to which the Commerce Department has authorized dis-
tribution of the shipment. 144
Under section 2410 of the EAA of 1979, the Commerce Depart-
ment may impose the following penalties for violation of United
States export laws:
(a) whoever knowingly violates any provision of this Act . . .
shall be fined not more than five times the value of the exports in-
volved or $50,000, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both.
(b)(l) whoever willfully exports anything contrary to any provi-
sion of this Act . . . with knowledge that such exports will be used
for the benefit of any country to which exports are restricted for na-
tional security or foreign policy purposes - (A) except in the case of
an individual, shall be fined not more than five times the value of the
exports involved or $1,000,000, whichever is greater; and (B) in the
case of an individual, shall be fined not more than $250,000, or im-
prisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b)(2) any person who is issued a validated license under this
Act for the export of any good or technology to a controlled country
and who, with knowledge that such a good or technology is being
used by such controlled country for military or intelligence gather-
ing purposes contrary to the conditions under which the license was
issued, willfully fails to report such use to the Secretary of Defense
- (A) except in the case of an individual, shall be fined not more
than five times the value of the exports involved or $1,000,000,
whichever is greater; and (B) in the case of an individual, shall be
fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both. 14 5
In addition, a civil penalty in the amount of $10,000 may be imposed
142 EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 14.
143 15 C.F.R. § 379.5(d) (1983).
144 d. See also id. §§ 375.1-.7.
145 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a)-(b). See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(1)(ii) (1983).
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for each violation of the EAA of 1979, the export regulations, export
orders, or the conditions of the export license. Violations involving
national security controls imposed under section 5 of the EAA of
1979 or controls imposed on the export of defense articles and de-
fense services under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, 146
however, may result in fines of up to $100,000.147 Further, each vio-
lation of the federal False Statements Act 148 is punishable by a fine
of $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years.149 Finally,
commodities or technical data shipped in violation or attempted vio-
lation of the EAA of 1979 are subject to seizure and forfeiture.1 50
The legislative proposals would allow the enforcing government
agency to make warrantless searches, seizures, and arrests.' 5' They
would also expand the reach of the export laws to include anyone
who conspires to violate United States export laws. 152 Additionally,
both versions would require that anyone convicted of a violation of
the EAA of 1979 forfeit to the United States any property interest
which that person has in the goods or technologies that were the
subject of the violation and any proceeds derived from the transac-
tion out of which the violation arose.' 53
IV. Review of Two Recent Examples Representing the Inherent
Problems in Promoting United States Exports While
Protecting National Security
Since the enactment of the EAA of 1979, the President has im-
plemented export controls on several occasions to safeguard United
States national security. The effects of such actions on United States
business have been overlooked entirely, 154 disregarded as insignifi-
cant, or treated as inherent costs in protecting national security.' 55
146 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1982).
147 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2410(c)(1). See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(3) (1983).
148 False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
149 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(2) (1983).
150 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). See 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(4) (1983).
151 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 31; H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 103(2).
152 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, § 30; H.R. 3231, supra note 10, § 102(a).
153 S. REP. No. 170, supra note 11, §§ 31, 73-74; H.R. 3231,supra note 10, § 102(d)(2).
154 See generally Statement of U.S. Measure Taken Against the Soviet Union, 17
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 142 (Dec. 29, 1981) (no mention of any consideration of costs
resulting from export controls).
155 See Use of Export Controls and Export Credits for Foreign Policy Purposes: Hearings on the
Increasing Use by the Executive Branch of Restrictions on U.S. Exports and Export Credits for the
Purpose of Promoting Foreign Policy Objectives Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1978) (testimony of Donald J. Morfee, Vice Presi-
dent, Pullman, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Export Controls]. See also Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on International Economic Foreign Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1982) (testimony of Lionel Olmer, Undersecretary of Commerce for
International Trade, that export controls may impose economic costs on American busi-
ness, but these are sometimes necessary costs); Export Controls on Oil and Gas Equipment:
Hearings and Markup Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Subcomms. on Europe and the Middle
East and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1982) (testimony
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In many cases, the approach of the Commerce Department has been
to impose export controls first and to calculate the costs later. 156
In calculating the impact of export controls on the United
States, both economic and noneconomic costs must be consid-
ered.1 57 Generally, the economic costs are borne by the private busi-
ness sector, either directly or indirectly, as a result of lost export
sales and of reduced foreign market shares.' 58 The United States
Government, however, has also been forced to suffer the economic
consequences of its actions, primarily as a result of the enactment of
legislation designed to soften the economic impact of the export
controls.159 The primary noneconomic costs, however, are borne al-
most exclusively by the Government.' 60
The following two examples illustrate both the need for and the
cost of imposing export controls on United States commodities. The
need for improving the export licensing of dual-use militarily critical
commodities is readily apparent from the attempted transshipment
of licensed exports of VAX 11-782 computers to the Soviet Union.
of James Buckley, Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, that President consid-
ered economic costs inherent in institution of sanctions against Poland). For an excellent
discussion on the economic impact of the use of export controls for foreign policy objec-
tives, see Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal
Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1983).
156 See Agricultural Embargoes and the Sanctity of Contracts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1982); U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export
Administration Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Part II, 96th Cong., 1 st Sess. 86 (1979) (testimony of W.
Robert McLellan, Vice President, FMC Corp.).
157 The more important economic costs include: (1) budgetary costs, relating to in-
creased costs incurred in administering the expanded export controls and in funding co-
rollary government programs designed to reduce the domestic economic impact of the
expanded controls; (2) lost sales costs, relating to lost profits, unrecouped expenses, can-
cellation charges, and other incidental costs; and (3) lost future sales costs, relating to loss
of world market share and to reduced confidence in U.S. exporters. The more important
noneconomic costs include: (1) injury to U.S. foreign relations; (2) loss of U.S. credibility
in its failure to accomplish its expressed foreign policy objectives; and (3) reduced eco-
nomic impact of export controls through repeated ineffective implementations of export
controls.
158 HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 3-6; Export Controls, supra note 155, at 146 (testi-
mony of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk). In commenting on U.S. use of unilateral
export controls for attaining political objectives, then Secretary of Commerce Juanita
Kreps stated that the export restrictions may simply transfer economic opportunity and
jobs from the United States to other countries, especially when the commodities restricted
are readily available from foreign sources. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at A-I (June 27,
1978).
159 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 3-6; Export Controls, supra note 155, at 146 (testi-
mony of former Secretary of State Dean Rusk).
160 Typical noneconomic costs include: (1) a breakdown in friendly relations between
the United States and countries adversely affected, directly or indirectly, by the U.S. export
controls; (2) increased friction between the U.S. Government and those segments of the
U.S. commercial sector that are adversely affected by the export controls; and (3) a de-
crease in the ideological and/or philosophical effectiveness of export sanctions that are
invoked repeatedly.
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Export controls imposed under the national security provisions of
section 5 of the EAA of 1979, after the Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan, 16' illustrate the short- and long-term costs to the
United States economy of embargoes on broad categories of
commodities.
A. Transshipment of VAX 11-782 Computers to the Soviet Union
On November 11, 1983, acting in response to a United States
Customs Service request, West German authorities seized a two mil-
lion dollar, highly sophisticated VAX 11-782 computer, 162 manufac-
tured by Digital Equipment Corporation of Maynard, Massachusetts,
seven minutes before its scheduled shipment by boat from Hamburg,
West Germany, to Sweden, where it would have been transshipped
to the Soviet Union.' 63 Shortly thereafter, on November 20, 1983,
Swedish authorities announced that they had seized another VAX 11-
782 computer just prior to its transshipment to the Soviet Union. 164
Eight days later, Bjorn Ericsson, the general director of the
Swedish Customs Authority, announced that two shipments of
United States computer software, for use with the seized VAX 11-782
computers, had been seized en route to the Soviet Union.' 6 5 On De-
cember 11, 1983, United Kingdom authorities seized a truck loaded
with Digital Equipment computer parts that were to be shipped to
France and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia. 166 The computer
hardware and software had been exported pursuant to export
licenses issued by the Commerce Department, apparently without
careful consideration of the particular export circumstances and the
militarily critical technology represented by the computers. 167
161 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404.
162 For a general discussion of the capabilities of the VAX 11-782 computer, see Scan-
nell, Mini Makers Boost 32-Bit Options - DEC Tops Off VAX, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 1, 1982,
at 1; Scannell, Superminis Riding the Crest of Swelling Popularity Wave, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar.
1, 1982, Product Spotlight, at 1.
163 See Werner, U.S. Has Bonn Stop Soviet-Bound Computer, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at
AI, col. 3; Brown, U.S. Working To Unravel Computer Case, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1983 (Busi-
ness & Finance) at D7, col. 4. The seizure was allowed to proceed only after a West Ger-
man appeals court overturned a lower court ruling that allowed the shipment to proceed.
164 Swedes Said To Halt KGB Shipment of U.S. Computer, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1983, at
A21, col. 1; Burks, Moscow-Bound Computer Is Seized, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1983, at A3, col.
1; Swedes Seize Second Shipment of Equipment, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1983, at A3, col. 4.
165 Sweden Intercepts Software, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1983, at A13, col. 1; Computer Pro-
grams Headed for Soviets Seized by Swedes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1983, at A11, col. 1.
166 Bartolick, DEC Gear Bound for Soviet Bloc Seized in UK, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 19,
1983, at 5.
167 Brown, Seized Computer Put on Display-Plan to Control Exports Promised, Wash. Post,
Dec. 20, 1983 (Business & Finance) at D7, col. 3. In response to the seizures of the two
VAX 11-782 computer systems en route to the Soviet Union, Treasury Secretary Donald T.
Regan and Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, in a Cabinet-level press conference,
stated that the acquisition of the computers would "have been an espionage coup" for the
Soviets, who could have used the computers to "produce vastly more accurate . . . and
more destructive weapons." Id. Further, according to William Green, Deputy Assistant
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The exportation of the VAX 11-782 computers involved those
aspects of high intrigue of which spy novels are often written.' 68
Digital Equipment Corporation sold the computers to a New York-
based computer broker and export company, which applied for and
received an export license from the Commerce Department to ex-
port the two computers to the Microelectronics Research Institute
(MRI), based in Cape Town, South Africa.' 69 MRI is controlled by
Richard Mueller, a West German citizen who is currently a fugitive
from a 1979 United States Customs Service indictment charging him
with illegally exporting semiconductor manufacturing equipment
from the United States to the Soviet Union.' 70 In addition, MRI is
Commissioner for Enforcement of the U.S. Customs Service, the VAX 11-782 was a fairly
sophisticated piece of equipment that could be used for missile guidance and keeping
track of military troops. Brown, U.S. W1orking To Unravel Computer Case, supra note 163, at
D7, col. 4.
168 Time for a Consensus, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 12, 1983, at 64 (according to a spokes-
man for Digital Equipment Corporation, "it reads like a Robert Ludlum novel"). See gener-
ally Kurtz, Soviet Network Intensifies Hunt for U.S. Secrets, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1983, at A 1l,
col. 1. (Soviet KGB lures employees of private defense contractors to sell military secrets
with "big money"); Haas, The Soviets Are Stealing Us Blind, 29 ARMY RESERVE MAG. 11 (Fall
1983) (the Soviet espionage network, staffed by some 20,000 members, has been ex-
tremely effective at acquiring U.S. military secrets); 5 Indicted in High Tech Export Scheme,
Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1983 (Business & Finance) at D9, col. I (five persons, including two
Americans, were indicted on charges of illegally shipping high-technology equipment, ad-
vanced computer disc memory devices, from the United States to Bulgaria).
Examples of recent Soviet acquisitions of U.S. military secrets include:
1) Soviet listening buoys, copied from advanced U.S. technology, have been discov-
ered on both the east and west coasts of the United States and in areas used for testing the
new U.S. "Trident" submarines. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has confirmed
that, while the buoys' microelectronics were made in the Soviet Union, they were replicas
of U.S. listening buoys manufactured in the United States.
2) A new Soviet cruise missile, designed to be launched from the torpedo tubes of
submerged submarines, bears an amazing resemblance to the U.S. "Tomahawk" missile.
According to a Business Week article in April 1983, investigations revealed that not only
had the Soviets pirated from U.S. shores the manufacturing technology used in the mis-
sile's turbofan engine, but the terrain-hugging Soviet missile contains a compact com-
puter-controlled radar guidance system filled with semiconducter chips so advanced that
the U.S. is convinced that their origin must be American.
3) The Soviet KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bazopasnosti, the Committee for
State Security) stole the design plans and drawings for the U.S. Air Force C-5A cargo
plane before it even flew.
4) Missile silos of the Soviet SS-13, the first Soviet solid propellant missile, are strik-
ingly similar to the U.S. "Minuteman" silos.
5) The Soviet SAM-7 surface-to-air missile, which was so effective in Vietnam against
low-flying U.S. aircraft, is largely a duplicate of the U.S. Army's "Redceye" missile.
6) The KGB was largely successful in stealing manufacturing components to equip
fully a Soviet factory to produce integrated circuits and microcomputers.
7) The range finder on a new Soviet tank, according to John N. McMahon, CIA Dep-
uty Director, is based on a U.S. design.
Haas, The Soviets are Stealing Us Blind, 29 ARMY RESERVE MAG. I I (Fall 1983).
169 Brown, Seized Computer Put on Display-Plan to Control Exports Promised, supra note
167, at D8, col. 4. The Commerce Department has refused to divulge the identity of the
New York-based computer broker on the grounds that the exporting company's identity is
confidential. Time for a Consensus, supra note 168, at 64.
170 46 Fed. Reg. 40,914 (1981). Richard Mueller has been denied U.S. export privi-
leges, including the issuance of any general or validated export license, from August 6,
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currently under Commerce Department investigation for violations
of United States export laws and was under investigation at the time
of the issuance of the export license.' 7 ' Upon arrival of the com-
puters in South Africa, MRI secretly attempted to transship them to
the Soviet Union via West Germany and Sweden.' 7 2
Over the last decade, international recognition of the superiority
of United States technology in the computer field has resulted in a
worldwide demand for United States computer technology ex-
ports.' 7 3 This demand has caused the United States computer in-
dustry to become increasingly reliant on a continued high volume of
export sales of computer hardware to insure the industry's continued
growth and profitability. 174 The technological complexity of com-
puter hardware, however, has rendered it virtually useless without
the corresponding export of compatible computer software, 17 5
which is much more strictly regulated by the Defense Department. 176
As a result, the United States computer industry is faced with the
dilemma of needing to export computer systems, including both
hardware and software, to foreign markets, while being restricted in
their export efforts by the Departments of Defense and Commerce
on the basis that the export of such computer systems could jeopard-
1981, to May 31, 2001. Id. at 40,915. See also Brown, Seized Computer Put on Display-Plan to
Control Exports Promised, supra note 167, at D7, col. 3. Richard Muelleir has been named by
the U.S. Government in illegal export cases on two separate occasions. He was banned
from U.S. export in connection with the first case and was a fugitive from a federal indict-
ment in the second case, reportedly in control of those companies in South Africa and
West Germany that played a role in the transshipment of the VAX 11-782 and named by
the United Kingdom as a KGB agent. Time for a Consensus, supra note 168, at 64.
171 Brown, Seized Computer Put on Display-Plan to Control Exports Promised, supra note
167, at D8, col. 4.
172 Brown, U.S. Working To Unravel Computer Case, supra note 163, at D8, col. 1; Swedes
Said to Halt KGB Shipment of U.S. Computer, supra note 164, at A21, col. 1.
173 U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Part 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54
(1979) (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International
Affairs). During the period of October 1979 to September 1980, the Office of Export Ad-
ministration granted export licenses for computer hardware and software, to controlled
destinations, totalling $145,963,807. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 121 EXPORT AD. REP. 30
(1979-80). This figure reflects 16.7% of all U.S. exports to controlled destinations. Id.
174 Hamilton, U.S. Computer Industry Avoids Economic Whirlpool, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1981,
at D3, col. 1. The term computer "hardware" is defined as: the electric, electronic, and
mechanical equipment used for processing data, consisting of cabinets, racks, tubes, tran-
sistors, wires, motors, and such. C.J. SIPPL & R.J. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY 84 (3d ed.
1983).
175 Gold, Goodman & Walker, Software: Recommendations for an Export Control Policy,
ACM COM., Apr. 1980, at 199-201. The term "computer software" is defined as: various
programming aids that are frequently supplied by manufacturers to facilitate the pur-
chaser's efficient operation of the equipment. C.J. SIPPL & R.J. SIPPL, supra note 174, at
170. Such software items include various assemblers, generators, subroutine libraries,
compilers, operating systems, and industry-application programs. Id.
176 Bucy Report, supra note 7.
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ize national security. 177
The Defense Department recognized as early as 1976 that the
evaluation of United States computer technology, under the critical
technologies approach, would prove to be an extremely difficult but
necessary task. 178 As a result, the Defense Department established
the Computer Network Critical Technology Expert Group
(CNCTEG) to advise it on the appropriate classification of computer
hardware and software as representing, or not representing, milita-
rily critical technology. 179 In its recommendations, the CNCTEG
advocated dividing all computer software into six categories for anal-
ysis as to whether it should be classified as representing militarily
critical technology.' 8 0 The eventual CNCTEG proposals, however,
were not adopted by the Defense Department in its organization of
the MCTL. I8 t
In response to the Defense Department's concern over the ex-
port of computer software, the Commerce Department issued in-
terim export licensing requirements for exports of computer
177 Hamilton, supra note 174, at D3, col. 1; Bucy, Protecting "Militarily Critical Technol-
ogy," ELECTRONICS, Jan. 17, 1980, at 36.
178 See generally Bucy Report, supra note 7; Memorandum from Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, reprinted in Dresser Industries,
supra note 2, at 90-92.
179 In addition to the CNCTEG, the Defense Department established five other Criti-
cal Technology Expert Groups to assist it in the organization of the MCTL: (1) materials
and structures, jet engines, and wide body aircraft; (2) large scale integrated production
technology; (3) array processors; (4) acoustic arrays; and (5) computer networks, high-
energy lasers and infra-red detection. Memorandum from Defense Secretary Harold
Brown to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, reprinted in Dresser Industries, supra
note 2, at 90-92.
IS0 The six categories recommended by the CNCTEG were:
1) General Assistance - All Software Function Areas;
2) Product Support Assistance - All Software Function Areas;
3) Product Shipment, Military Software - All Software Function Areas;
4) Product Shipment, Other Software - All Software Function Areas;
5) Product Shipment, Commercial Software, and Usage - Software Devel-
opment and Maintenance Aids, and Application Software; and
6) Product Shipment, Commercial Software, and Usage - Widely Available
Operating Systems, Network Oriented Software, Database Management
Software, and User Interface Software.
181 The actual MCTL computer software categories finally adopted by the Defense
Department are:
A) Software Technology
1) Development Environment Technology
a) Software Life-Cycle Management Technology
b) Software Library Data Base Technology
c) Software Development Tool Technology
d) Formal Methods and Tools for Developing Trusted Software Technology
B) Operations and Maintenance Technology
1) Maintenance of Large Software Product Technology
C) Application Software Technology
1) Secure Software Technology
2) Large Self-Adapting Software System Technology
45 Fed. Reg. 65,016 (1980).
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software.' 8 2 These interim regulations were designed to implement
several of the CNCTEG recommendations and to provide the Office
of Export Administration with additional information as to the possi-
ble military applications of specific exports of computer hardware
and software. The regulations, however, increased the burden on
the United States computer industry in obtaining an export license
for exports of computer hardware and software, without a corre-
sponding increase in the restrictions on exports of militarily critical
technologies. 18 3
Therefore, there clearly is a need for more stringent export li-
censing precautions to guard against future inadvertent export li-
censing of United States dual-use militarily critical technologies.
These more stringent precautions, however, need not cause further
interference with the United States business community, provided
the Departments of Commerce and Defense begin to work more har-
moniously toward identifying those United States commodities or
technologies whose export could potentially threaten national secur-
ity. This is the approach that Congress foresaw in enacting the EAA
of 1979. The mandatory unification of the CCL and of the MCTL
should provide the additional safeguards necessary to insure that the
preceding examples will not be repeated.
B. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Resulting United States
Embargoes
On December 26, 1979, Soviet armed forces invaded Afghani-
stan, 18 4 assisted in the overthrow and execution of Afghanistan's
Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin,18 5 and supported the installation
of Babrak Karmal as the new Afghan leader.' 8 6 Responding to the
invasion, on January 4, 1980, President Carter announced the sus-
pension of the shipment of seventeen million tons of grain to the
Soviet Union and the suspension of the issuance of validated licenses
for the export of high technology commodities to the Soviet
Union.' 8 7 Three days later, after consulting with the Department of
182 45 Fed. Reg. 80,485 (1980).
183 In response to criticism by U.S. exporters over extensive red-tape and procedural
delays in obtaining export licenses, various bills have been introduced in Congress that
would abolish the Commerce Department and create a new Department of International
Trade. See, e.g., Comments of Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah) in U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 341,
at B-I (Jan. 20, 1981).
184 Goshko, U.S. Assails Soviets on Afghanistan, Wash. Post, Dec. 27, 1979, at Al, col. 1;
Carter Tells Soviets To Pull Out of Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
185 Auerbach, Afghan President Is Toppled in Coup, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1979, at AI, col.
4.
186 Id.
187 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Address to the Nation, Jan. 4, 1980, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 26 (Jan. 14, 1980), reprinted in Response. . . Must Match the Gravity of the
Soviet Action, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1980, at A7, col. 1. See The U.S. Countermeasures, Wash. Post,
Jan. 5, 1980, at A6, col. 1. The Commerce Department responded by issuing regulations,
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Agriculture, President Carter directed the Commerce Department to
impose an embargo on all United States grain exports to the Soviet
Union. 188
In imposing export controls on both grain and high technology
commodities, President Carter and the Commerce Department re-
lied on both sections 5 and 6 of the EAA of 1979.189 While section 6
requires the President and the Commerce Department to consider
specific factors and to consult with both Congress and potentially
affected United States industries before imposing foreign policy ex-
port controls,' 90 section 5 requires only that the President consider
effective January 11, 1980, suspending all outstanding validated licenses and all pending
validated license applications for the export of controlled commodities to the Soviet
Union. 45 Fed. Reg. 3027 (1980). These regulations provided in pertinent part that:
(a) All validated licenses, reexport authorizations, 15 C.F.R. § 374, and parts and
components authorizations, id. § 376.12, for shipment of any commodities or transfer of
any technical data, id. § 379, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) are sus-
pended. This suspension includes shipments under special bulk licenses, described in
§ 373, to the extent they authorize shipment of commodities to the U.S.S.R. Except as
described in the Saving Clause, no exports or reexports may be made against such sus-
pended licenses or authorizations without further approval from the Office of Export Ad-
ministration. This order does not affect any agricultural commodities or products made
subject to validated licensing pursuant to § 376.5 of these regulations.
(b) Saving Clause. Shipments of any commodity or technical data previously authorized
for shipment to the U.S.S.R. by a validated license or authorization, as aboard any export-
ing carrier, or in transit to a port of exit pursuant to actual orders for export prior to 12
noon ESTJanuary 11, 1980, may be exported under that validated license or authorization
up to 12 noon ESTJanuary 13, 1980. Any such shipment not exported before 12 noon
January 13, 1980, may not be shipped to the U.S.S.R. without further authorization from
the Office of Export Administration. 45 Fed. Reg. at 3029.
188 Text of Presidential Directive, reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). The Presi-
dent, however, directed that the embargo would not affect the eight million metric tons of
wheat and corn covered by the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement. Id. In response, the
Commerce Department issued regulations on January 9, 1980, effective January 7, 1980,
requiring validated licenses for the export of any U.S. agricultural commodity to the Soviet
Union. 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980).
189 In his report to Congress pursuant to the mandate of § 2405(e) of the EAA of
1979, which dealt only with the imposition of an agricultural embargo, President Carter
stated that he was acting in both the national security and the foreign policy interests of
the United States. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 292, at M-1 (Jan. 29, 1980). Further, the
President stated that the exports being curtailed would make a significant contribution to
the military potential of the Soviet Union, which would be detrimental to the national
security of the United States. Id. See also Agricultural Embargo Implications, supra note 50, at
9.
190 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2405(b), (c) & (e). The specific criteria the President
must consider under section 6 include:
(1) the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign
policy purpose, in.light of other factors, including the availability from other
countries of the goods or technology proposed for such controls;
(2) the compatibility of the proposed controls with the foreign policy
objectives of the United States, including the effort to counter international
terrorism, and with overall United States policy towards the country that is
the proposed target of the controls;
(3) the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of
such export controls by the United States;
(4) the likely effects of the proposed controls on the export performance
of the United States, on the competitive position of the United States in the
international economy, on the international reputation of the United States
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the foreign availability of the embargoed commodities, which may be
disregarded if necessary to protect national security.' 9 ' Further, sec-
tion 5 does not require the President or the Commerce Department
to consult with Congress or with potentially affected private indus-
tries in implementing national security controls. 19
2
This joinder of the President's authority to impose export con-
trols for national security and foreign policy reasons blatantly defeats
the congressional intention behind the statutory separation of these
bases of authority. In addition to imposing export controls on grain
and high technology commodities under both sections 5 and 6, Pres-
ident Carter imposed export controls on various other aspects of
United States trade with the Soviet Union under section 6 alone.'
93
On February 4, 1980, the Commerce Department announced
that it no would longer require the issuance of a validated license for
the export of particular agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union
and that it would begin considering, on a case-by-case basis, vali-
dated export license applications for the export of certain other agri-
cultural commodities. 194 Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 1980, the
as a supplier of goods and technology, and on individual United States com-
panies and their employees and communities, including the effects of the
controls on existing contracts;
(5) the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls ef-
fectively; and
(6) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.
Id. § 2405(b). Because the EAA of 1979 requires only that the President consider the
above factors, he is free to disregard any of the considerations that are adverse to his
desired exercise of export controls for foreign policy reasons. S. REP. No. 169, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1147, 1154-56. As a
result, section 6 has failed to restrain effectively the exercise of executive discretion.
191 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2404(0.
192 Id.
193 On February 4, 1980, the Commerce Department issued regulations requiring vali-
dated licenses for the export of U.S. phosphates to the Soviet Union. 45 Fed. Reg. 8293
(1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 24,458 (1980). On March 28, 1980, President Carter directed the
Commerce Department to prohibit the export of U.S. goods and technology to the Soviet
Union in connection with the Olympic Games and to prohibit payments or transactions
that could provide financial support for the Games. Memorandum on Prohibition of U.S.
Transactions with Respect to the Olympic Games, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 559 (Mar. 28,
1980).
On March 28, 1980, the Commerce Department, in response, issued regulations im-
plementing President Carter's directive. 45 Fed. Reg. 21,612 (1980). On May 6, 1980 in
response to reports that trucks produced at the Soviet's Kama River production plant were
used in the invasion of Afghanistan, the Commerce Department issued regulations requir-
ing a validated license for the export of U.S. truck assembly lines to the Kama River plant.
45 Fed. Reg. 30,617 (1980); An Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions: Implications for Trade
and Diplomacy in the 1980 s: Report Prepared for the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 67-70 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Af-
ghanistan Sanctions]. For a critical discussion of the Kama River Project, see also 125 CONG.
REC. 26,813-16 (1979). Finally, on June 3, 1980, the Commerce Department imposed
validated license requirements on all exports of U.S. commodities to Afghanistan to pre-
vent their transshipment to the Soviet Union. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,415 (1980).
194 45 Fed. Reg. 8289 (1980). The grain embargo regulations were amended to allow
the export of such commodities as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and wood products under
a general export license. The remaining agricultural commodities were divided into two
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Commerce Department announced that it would commence review-
ing validated export license applications for the export of high tech-
nology commodities to the Soviet Union.195 The issuance of export
licenses for the export of high technology commodities, however,
was to be governed by new, stricter licensing regulations promul-
gated in response to the growing concern over the flow of United
States high technology exports to the Soviet Union. 196 The broad
export controls on the bulk of United States grain exports to the
Soviet Union were continued, however, until April 24, 1981, when
President Reagan, honoring a much criticized campaign promise,
terminated the embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union. 197
The remaining export controls imposed by President Carter, under
section 6 alone, were gradually terminated or allowed to expire.' 98
groups. The first group included those commodities subject to a validated license but for
which no validated license would be issued, because they had been determined to be com-
modities that could contribute significantly to the Soviet grain-livestock complex. This
group included such agricultural commodities as meats, dairy products, birds' eggs,
grains, milled grain products, peanuts, certain oils, and animal feeds.
The second group contained commodities that were subject to validated licensing re-
quirements but for which licenses would be issued on a case-by-case basis, if it was deter-
mined that the objectives of the embargo would not be undermined by their export to the
Soviet Union. This group included such agricultural commodities as live animals, fish and
shellfish, hides, skins, leather, malts and starches, certain oils, tallow, and fats and greases.
195 See 45 Fed. Reg. 29,568 (1980).
196 Under these stricter licensing regulations, export controls toward the Soviet Union
were tightened so that export license applications for export to the Soviet Union, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, which required COCOM approval, were denied, except in a few
limited circumstances. Further, export license applications for export to other Warsaw
Pact countries, Albania, Laos, and the Mongolian People's Republic were evaluated in
light of: (1) the risk of diversion to military use in those countries; (2) the risk of diversion
to the Soviet Union; and (3) efforts by certain East European countries to distance them-
selves from the Soviet Union's Afghanistan policies. EAA Overview, supra note 13, at 4.
See OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY 1980 at
20 (1981) (export licenses for commodities regulated by COCOM would generally be de-
nied); Afghanistan Sanctions, supra note 193, at 67 (indicating that the Commerce Depart-
ment was going to begin strictly enforcing restrictions on the export of U.S. high
technology commodities); 45 Fed. Reg. 29,568 (1980) (requiring validated licenses for the
export of certain new U.S. commodities that could be militarily advantageous to the Soviet
Union).
Under this new licensing approach, the Commerce Department began reevaluating
476 pending export license applications out of the more than 1,000 export licenses af-
fected by the embargo on high technology commodities. OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY 1981 at 30 (1982); OFFICE OF EXPORT AD-
MIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY 1980, at 27 (1981). Over the
next five to six months, the Commerce Department reinstated 281 licenses, revoked 115
licenses, and cancelled 54 licenses. OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Ex-
PORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY 1981, at 30 (1982).
197 Memoranda from the President on Limitation of Agricultural Sales to the Soviet
Union, 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 466 (April 24, 1981). See also Rosenfeld, It's Our
Grain Deal, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1981, at AI5, col. 1; Sinclair, Review Set on Grain Embargo,
Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1981 (Business & Finance) at Dl, col. 6.
198 The export controls relating to the 1980 Summer Olympic Games were allowed to
expire on January 21, 1983. See 48 Fed. Reg. 3359 (1983). On April 24, 1983, the U.S.
embargo on U.S. phosphate exports to the Soviet Union was ended. See 46 Fed. Reg.
23,923 (1981). In response to the turmoil in Poland, however, President Reagan tight-
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In October 1979, immediately prior to the invasion of Afghani-
stan, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the Soviet
Union's purchase of twenty-five million metric tons of United States
corn and wheat,' 9 9 under the United States-Soviet Grain Agreement
of 1975.200 The imposition of the grain embargo resulted in an eco-
nomic loss to United States farmers of more than two billion dol-
lars. 20' Attempting to reduce the economic impact of the grain
embargo on the United States farmers, President Carter imple-
mented government grain programs costing in excess of $2.5 bil-
lion.20 2 Overall, analysts believe that the United States economy lost
approximately $11.4 billion in national output and approximately
ened U.S. export controls on exports destined for the Soviet Union's Kama River truck
complex. See 47 Fed. Reg. 9201 (1982).
199 Agricultural Embargo Implications, supra note 50, at 9 n. 1. See also Afghanistan Sanctions,
supra note 193, at 24.
200 Grains Agreement, Oct. 20, 1975, United States-U.S.S.R., 26 U.S.T. 2971, T.I.A.S.
No. 8206 (expired Sept. 30, 1983). The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Supply Agreement provided
that, over a five-year period, the Soviets would be allowed to purchase at least six million
metric tons of corn and wheat annually, beginning with the 1976-77 crop year. Further,
whenever the U.S. supply of grain was sufficient, the Soviets could purchase an additional
two million metric tons of corn and wheat without prior approval or consultation with the
U.S. Government. Id. The agreement was scheduled to expire on September 30, 1981,
but was extended for the 1981-82 and 1982-83 crop years. Agricultural Embargo Implications,
supra note 50, at 9 n.l.
On October 1, 1983, a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. long-term grain agreement, following the
general framework of the 1975 Agreement, became effective. The new agreement re-
quires the Soviets to purchase nine million metric tons of corn and wheat annually and
allows the Soviets to purchase an additional twelve million metric tons without prior U.S.
Government approval. Id. at 23. Soviet negotiators, however, succeeded in deleting a
clause, included in the first agreement, which allowed the U.S. Government to cut off sales
in times of short supply. Id.
201 Schnittker Associates, Effects of the 1980 and 1981 Limitations on Grain Exports to the
USSR on Business Activity, Jobs, Government Costs, and Farmers 1 (Feb. 12, 1982) (study pre-
pared for the National Corn Development Foundation) [hereinafter cited as Schnittker
Report]. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Report B-199124, Lessons to be
Learned from Offsetting the Impact of the Soviet Grain Sales Suspension, CED-81-1 10July 27, 1981,
at 6 [hereinafter cited as GAO Report] (the GAO estimated that 1980 farm income and the
value of agricultural exports would each decrease by about $3 billion, absent federal gov-
ernment action to offset the decline in agricultural prices caused by the embargo); Sinclair,
Grain Sales Help Push U.S.-Soviet Trade to Near-Record Level, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1981, at A5,
col. I (during the year 1980, the loss in total U.S. export trade with the Soviet Union was
estimated at $2.1 billion, and the loss in U.S. farm exports was estimated at $1.8 billion).
In the EAA 1980 Annual Report, the Commerce Department reported that the grain
embargo resulted in lost exports of approximately thirteen million metric tons of corn and
four million metric tons of wheat. OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Ex-
PORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY 1980 at 146 (1981). Further, the Report indicated that the
embargo caused the loss of approximately 1.3 million metric tons of soybean meal, ap-
proximately 65,000 tons of poultry, and numerous other large sales of agricultural prod-
ucts pending in negotiations at the time of the embargo. Id. See also GAO Report, supra, at
2. See generally Rich, Most Farm Groups Oppose Grain Cutoff, Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1980, at A12,
col. 1.
202 Schnittker Report, supra note 201, at i. Following the grain embargo of 1980, an
embargo protection clause was added to the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, requiring
the Agriculture Department to make payments to producers or increase the price-support
loan rate if the President restricts agricultural exports to any country for reasons of na-
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$3.1 billion in personal income. 203
While critics of the grain embargo have argued that the eco-
nomic costs were excessive, any costs incurred to safeguard national
security should be justifiable.20 4 Such justification, however, re-
quires that the Soviet grain embargo effectively safeguarded United
States national security. If this was not achieved, any costs, eco-
nomic or noneconomic, must be deemed excessive.
In compliance with its reporting obligations under the EAA of
1979,205 the Commerce Department reported to Congress that the
grain embargo would have a marked and adverse effect on Soviet
livestock and meat production capabilities. 20 6 The General Account-
ing Office (GAO), however, determined that, based upon informa-
tion supplied by the Department of Agriculture, the Soviets were
able to locate new sources of grain to replace the lost United States
grain exports. 20 7 Primarily, the Soviet Union was able to purchase
the needed grain from three United States allies-Canada, Australia,
and Argentina. 208 As a result, the GAO determined that the grain
tional security or foreign policy without placing similar restrictions on all U.S. exports.
Agricultural Embargo Implications, supra note 50, at 10.
Further, an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1970 prohibits the President from
curtailing the export of agricultural products for which an export sales contract has been
entered into before the announcement of an embargo and which requires delivery within
270 days after the date of imposition of the embargo. Id. See also Gwertzman, U.S. and
China Near Agreement on Sale of American Grains, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at Al, col. 4 (in
addition to implementing federal government relief programs costing between $2 and $3
billion, a grain agreement with the People's Republic of China became a political necessity
for the Carter Administration to offset the criticism of its grain embargo).
203 Schnittker Report, supra note 201, at 7-8.
204 See Use of Export Controls and Export Credits for Foreign Policy Purposes: Hearings on the
Increasing Use by the Executive Branch of Restrictions on U.S. Exports and Export Credits for the
Purpose of Promoting Foreign Policy Objectives Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 21 (1978) (testimony of David Packard, Chairman of
the Board, Hewlett-Packard); Lippman, Reagan Asks Strategic-Export Curbs, Wash. Post, Apr.
6, 1983 (Business & Finance) at FI, col. 2 (quoting Lionel Olmer, Undersecretary for In-
ternational Trade, Commerce Department, as stating that the Reagan Administration,
while recognizing that export controls may impose economic costs on business firms, be-
lieves that maintaining export controls for national security reasons is vital to the safety of
the United States).
205 EAA of 1979, supra note 6, § 2413 (requires the Secretary of Commerce to report
to Congress at the end of each calendar year on the administration of the EAA of 1979
during the preceding fiscal year).
206 OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY
1980 at 145 (1981).
207 GAO Report, supra note 201, at 46. The Reagan Administration has also publicly
acknowledged that the Soviets were able to locate alternative grain suppliers. Hoffman,
Soviets Accept Reagan Offer to Extend Grain Sales a Year, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1982, at AI, col.
2.
208 GAO Report, supra note 201, at 49. In fact, the U.S. grain embargo resulted in
significantly increased continuing grain exports to the Soviet Union from Canada, Austra-
lia, and Argentina. For example, Canada increased its annual grain exports to the Soviet
Union from 2.1 million metric tons, in the 1978-79 crop year, to 8.9 million metric tons, in
the 1982-83 crop year. Agricultural Embargo Implications, supra note 50, at 94. Australia in-
creased its annual grain exports to the Soviet Union from 0.1 million metric tons, in the
1978-79 crop year, to 4.0 million metric tons, in the 1979-80 crop year, but its grain ex-
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embargo had little, if any, effect on Soviet meat consumption.20 9
In addition, Senate hearings on the grain embargo found that
approximately five million metric tons of United States grain were
transshipped to the Soviet Union from third-world countries during
the embargo. 210 The only actual effect of the United States grain em-
bargo on the Soviet Union appears to have been that the Soviets
were required to pay approximately one billion dollars extra for the
needed grain.211
After four years, however, the long-range effects of the grain
embargo are just beginning to be assessed properly. First, from crop
year 1978-79 to crop year 1982-83, the overall United States share of
the world market for wheat and soybeans (and soybean products)
declined by four percentage points, and the overall United States
share of the world market for coarse grains declined by three per-
centage points.212 From crop year 1979-80 to crop year 1982-83,
major competitors of the United States in the world grain and soy-
bean markets substantially expanded their production and exports to
capture a growing share of the world markets. 21 3
Further, the United States has come to be viewed as an unrelia-
ble world supplier of agricultural commodities. 214 This has resulted
in an increased demand for agricultural exports from foreign trade
competitors of the United States.21 5 Finally, since 1980, the Soviet
Union has entered into a number of bilateral agricultural trade
agreements with several of the United States major grain competi-
tors, 2 16 resulting in reduced Soviet dependency on United States
grain imports and in continued economic injury to the United States
ports, while still substantially more than in the 1978-79 crop year, have decreased to 1.0
million metric tons in the 1982-83 crop year. Id.
Argentina increased its annual grain exports to the Soviet Union from 1.4 million
metric tons, in the 1978-79 crop year, to 9.6 million metric tons, in the 1982-83 crop year.
Id. A substantial amount of Argentina's grain exports, however, are the result of a five-
year grain export agreement with the Soviet Union, signed in 1980, that requires the Sovi-
ets to purchase at least four million metric tons of corn and sorghum and 500,000 million
metric tons of soybeans annually beginning in 1981. Id. See also Lewis, France, on Election
Eve, Announces Grain Sale to Soviets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1981, at A12, col. 3. See also
Krause, Argentina Reects U.S. Proposal For Limiting Grain Sale to Soviets, Wash. Post, Jan. 11,
1980, at A20, col. 1.
209 GAO Report, supra note 201, at 46.
210 U.S. Embargo of Food and Technology to the Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Garn referring to estimates of four to five million metric tons of U.S. grain being shipped
to the Soviet Union).
211 1982-83 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-83/82) 26 (1982). See also Moyer & Mabry, supra
note 155, at 145.
212 Agricultural Embargo Implications, supra note 50, at viii.
213 Id. at viii-ix.
214 Id. at ix-x.
215 Id.
216 Id. at xii. For example, a Soviet grain agreement with Canada calls for the Soviets
to purchase a minimum of 25 million metric tons of grain over a five-year period, with the
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farmer. 2 17
While the adverse economic impact of the grain embargo was
substantial, the long-range economic costs on exports of high tech-
nology commodities probably will far exceed the agricultural costs.
The high technology commodities embargo was imposed primarily
to cripple the Soviet Union's industrial modernization efforts to such
a degree that the Soviets would have little choice but to withdraw
their troops from Afghanistan. President Carter apparently also im-
posed the export controls to show the Soviet Union and the interna-
tional community that the United States would not stand idly by in
the wake of such overt use of force by the Soviet Union. 2 18
Primarily, the United States embargo affected manufacturers
and exporters of computer hardware and software, automobiles,
communications, chemicals, lasers, and oil and gas drilling equip-
ment. 2 19 For example, the following export licenses were adversely
affected: export licenses held by IBM and Ingersoll-Rand to export
computer hardware to the Kama River truck complex were re-
voked; 22 0 export licenses held by Caterpillar Tractor to export pipe-
laying tractors used on the Soviet transcontinental natural gas
pipeline were suspended for several months; 22 1 and export licenses
held by Dresser Industries to export oil and gas drilling technology
and equipment used in a Soviet oil drill bit factory were revoked. 222
Apparently, the Carter Administration determined that the eco-
Canadian government providing $1 billion in guaranteed commercial credit to finance the
sale. Id.
Similarly, a Soviet grain agreement with Brazil calls for Brazil annually to provide
500,000 metric tons of soybeans and 400,000 metric tons of soybean meal during the
period 1982-86, and 500,000 metric tons of corn during the period 1983-86. Id. For a
brief discussion of the Soviet grain agreement with Argentina, see supra note 208.
217 Weisman, Record Soviet Purchase Seen in Grain Accord, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1982, at
A33, col. 1 (Agriculture Secretary Block was quoted as saying that prior to the grain em-
bargo, the U.S. supplied 70% of total Soviet grain imports, compared with 30% in 1982,
and that the Carter Administration "threw away" this share in 1980 when it imposed the
grain embargo. Id. at A34, col. 5).
218 Id. See also U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 292, at M-l (Jan. 29, 1980) (reporting to
Congress his decision to impose the grain embargo, President Carter stated that export
controls will impress upon Soviet peoples the consequences of their government's
actions).
219 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1980, at A18, col. 2; Wall St.J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
220 OFFICE OF EXPORT ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMIN. ANN. REP. FY
1980, at 35 (1981).
221 Afghanistan Sanctions, supra note 193, at 72. While the Soviets had originally or-
dered 200 pipelaying tractors from Caterpillar Tractor, the licensing delay caused them to
reduce their order to only 100 U.S. pipelaying tractors and, instead, to place an order for
150 pipelaying tractors from the Japanese. Id. See Auerbach, U.S. Lets Soviets Buy Pipelayers,
Retaining Grip on High-Tech Gear, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1983, at A12, col. I (on August 20,
1983, the Reagan Administration lifted the license restrictions on the basis that the pipe-
laying tractors, which cost approximately $500,000 each, did not represent U.S. high tech-
nology and could not be converted to military use). See also Auerbach, Reagan To End Curb
on Sale of Pipelayers to Soviet Union, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
222 Afghanistan Sanctions, supra note 193, at 76.
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nomic cost of lost United States export sales to the Soviet Union was
acceptable in view of the threat posed to both national security and
to world peace by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. 223
The principal concern, however, is whether the impact on the Soviet
Union justified the economic cost to the United States. 224 Origi-
nally, the Carter Administration viewed its imposition of sanctions
"as the first steps in an international drive to show the Soviet Union
the high cost of its actions."' 22 5 In retrospect, however, international
reprisals against the Soviet Union failed to measure up to the Carter
Administration's predictions.
The actual impact of the embargo appears to be openly dis-
puted, with the majority of evidence tending to indicate that the So-
viets were able to find alternative sources for those high technology
commodities that they were unable to acquire from United States
manufacturers. 2 26 Further, a report issued by the European Eco-
nomic Community on the long-term effects of the high technology
embargo concluded that United States exporters probably lost a sub-
stantial share of the Soviet market to other developed western ex-
porting countries. 2
2 7
The United States perhaps first should have secured multilateral
agreements, with all other principal suppliers of the proposed com-
modities to be embargoed, banning exports of those commodities to
the Soviet Union.2 2 8 Absent such multilateral agreements, the costs
of imposing export controls will exceed the benefits derived from
such controls, and the corresponding effectiveness of the controls
will be reduced drastically. 22 9 Clearly, the grain embargo and the
223 In 1980 the United States exported about $40 million worth of such products and
associated technology (computers, automobiles, communications, chemicals, lasers,
microprocessing equipment, and oil and gas drilling equipment) to the Soviet Union. Mr.
Jody Powell, White House Press Secretary under President Carter, contended that the rel-
atively small value of those sales, compared with total American exports, was far less im-
portant than the potential consequences for the Soviet Union, which is trying to expand
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high technology embargo failed to accomplish the original goals
enunciated by the Carter Administration. The Soviet Union's armed
forces remain in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's people have sur-
vived the minimal deprivations resulting from the United States em-
bargo, and the Soviet Union's rapid industrialization plans have not
been hindered significantly. The United States economy as a whole
has suffered substantial short-term losses in the export of commodi-
ties and will probably suffer significant long-term losses due to po-
tentially permanent reductions in foreign market shares.2 30
V. Conclusion
Members of the federal government, the international business
community, and the legal profession apparently have reached a con-
sensus that export controls are necessary to safeguard the national
security of the United States. 23' These factions, however, disagree
on the most appropriate manner for imposing national security ex-
port controls. The Government has argued quite convincingly
before Congress that more stringent export controls are necessary
for the protection of national security. 232 The international business
community's position is supported by the testimony of Former Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk, who said that the United States refusal to
trade for security or political reasons deprives the United States of
trade benefits in the form of convertible currencies or goods and
services needed for its national existence. 233 Further, the interna-
tional bar of the legal profession has expressed its view that:
[t]he law and politics of U.S. export controls-other than munitions
controls-are based on an economic myth, namely, that by withhold-
ing permission to export goods, equipment, and technology to the
Soviet Union we can substantially hurt the Soviet economy and
thereby influence Soviet conduct. In fact, however, even a total em-
bargo on exports from the United States could not have more than a
minimal adverse effect on the Soviet economy. 23 4
The challenge, therefore, is one of enacting legislation that in-
sures United States national security, while freeing the United States
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business community from too stringent or too excessive export con-
trols. Congress, however, has failed to meet this challenge. Since
June of 1983, it has been reviewing specific proposals for amending
and reauthorizing the EAA of 1979. Even though both houses of
Congress passed proposals, the Conference Committee was unable
to achieve a consensus on several controversial issues regarding na-
tional security, enforcement, and South Africa. As a result, United
States export policies continue to operate under a state of national
economic emergency. The business community remains frustrated at
the confusing and often contradictory signals given by Congress,
whose inability to enact legislation has highlighted the significance
and controversy of the United States export laws and policies.

